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This paper explores the Commonwealth’s power over universities. First it considers the
extent of Commonwealth constitutional power as a matter of strict law and second it
considers that constitutional power within a wider legal, administrative and practical
context. The paper reaches four general conclusions: (i) the Commonwealth enjoys
significant direct constitutional power over higher education;  (ii) the Commonwealth
has significant power to influence and form higher education policy indirectly
through conditional funding of universities; (iii) notwithstanding its direct legislative
power and its capacity for indirect financial influence, critically the Commonwealth
presently lacks the cohesive constitutional power necessary to regulate
the universities directly and comprehensively, although this may change in light of an
impending decision of the High Court; (iv) in light of this analysis, any genuine attempt
at national higher education legislation or regulation by the Commonwealth would,
at present, have to be based upon significant cooperation with the States.
This paper explores the extent of the power of the Commonwealth over higher education
generally and universities in particular.  Within this general purpose, it seeks to do two things:
first, to consider the extent of Commonwealth constitutional power as a matter of strict law;
and second, to consider that constitutional power within a wider legal, administrative and
practical context. Achievement of this second aim involves placing the legal aspects of
Commonwealth power within a context of legislative and policy reality.  
In broad terms, the paper reaches four general conclusions. The first is that the
Commonwealth enjoys some significant direct constitutional power over the area of higher
education.  The second is that the Commonwealth possesses a very significant power to
influence and form higher education policy indirectly, primarily through the mechanism of
conditional funding to higher education institutions. The third, and critical, conclusion is that
notwithstanding its direct legislative power and its capacity for indirect financial influence, the
Commonwealth presently lacks the cohesive constitutional power necessary to regulate the
higher education sector directly in any comprehensive way — although this position may
change in light of an impending decision of the High Court.  The final conclusion reached is
that, in light of this analysis, any genuine attempt at national higher education legislation or
regulation by the Commonwealth would, at least at the present, have to be based upon a
significant degree of cooperation with the States.    
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Context
At least three important contextual factors condition the exercise of Commonwealth power
in connection with higher education. The first is historical. The Commonwealth never was
intended to possess legislative power over Universities, these being regarded as falling within
the general residue of power preserved by the Constitution to the States. Indeed, falling
outside all the enumerated powers of the Commonwealth contained in section 51,
universities are something of a classic instance of continuing State power.1 The reality of
federal involvement in higher education is that it is an unintended consequence of the failure
of the financial settlement under the Constitution, which left the Commonwealth flush with
funds, and the States with insufficient revenue to meet their policy obligations, including
those posed by Universities.2
The second point is that the apparent ambitions of the Commonwealth in relation to higher
education clearly comprise only a part of a much wider centralising direction. This wider
direction includes incursions into such fields as industrial relations, school education, health,
defamation, taxation and the control of ports. Collectively, these initiatives represent the most
intense attempt to centralise power within the Australian federation since the Second
World War.3
The third point is practical in nature. In considering the extent of Commonwealth power over
any particular subject matter, including higher education, there inevitably will be a
fundamental difference between the conclusion that the Commonwealth enjoys substantial
as opposed to total power. The reason for this is that, once power over a particular subject
is divided, even into relatively unequal parts, the regulation of that subject matter will be
exponentially more complicated. This is the so called ‘mosaic effect’, whereby cohesive
regulation is rendered problematic by a pattern of scattered responsibility. The practical
result in the present context is that the more gaps that exist within Commonwealth power to
regulate higher education, the less practical a Commonwealth-based national
scheme will become, even accepting the existence of very significant Commonwealth
constitutional power.
The range of Commonwealth legislative and regulatory ambitions
One important preliminary question here concerns the identity of those aspects of higher
education that the Commonwealth Government might wish to regulate. Clearly, the capacity
of the Commonwealth to regulate ‘higher education’ will depend entirely upon those aspects
of the sector that it does indeed wish to control. The general point here is that the
Commonwealth’s ambitions seem to be highly elastic. Thus, on the basis of its published
discussion papers,4 two points may be made. First, the Commonwealth appears to wish to
regulate as much of the higher education industry as its constitutional powers, expansively
understood, will allow. Second, within this wide ambition, the Commonwealth recognises
that difficulties attend the regulation of several topics.
2
1 For example, the Founding Fathers had no doubt that despite the fact that universities were corporations, they
were not trading corporations, and so fell outside the corporations power contained in section 52(20): see the
comments of Isaacs J. in Huddart Parker and Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Moorehead (1909) 8 C.L.R. 330, 394.
The Constitution preserves to the States all powers not conferred specifically upon the Commonwealth: see
Constitution, section 107.
2 As to which see generally Saunders (1986).
3 The classic exposition of the Howard Government’s new federalism is contained in the address of Prime Minister
John Howard on 11 April 2005  to the Menzies Research centre entitled “Reflections on Australian Federalism”:
http://www.pm.gov.au/news/speeches/speech1320.html
4 The most relevant publications are DEST (2004) and DEST (2005) 
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Again on the basis of its discussion papers, a number of specific topics would appear to be
subject to Commonwealth ambitions. The first is the accreditation and establishment of
higher education institutions, including universities (DEST 2004:15; DEST 2005:18–20).  The
second is the governance of higher education institutions, including the constitution of their
councils and other governance bodies (2004:10–11; 2005:10–11). The third is overall control
of their teaching and syllabus arrangements, including teaching quality and degree offerings.5
The fourth is control of the overall research profile of universities, including their basic
research directions, priorities and funding.6 The fifth is the ownership and management of
university land, including its enjoyment, sale and other disposition (2004:10; 2005:5–6, 14).
The sixth is the control of the commercial operations of higher education institutions,
including the business forms of those operations, and the parameters for their deployment
(2004:11; 2005:7–9). The seventh comprises the reporting and accountability regimes for
higher education institutions, including regimes relating to finance, teaching quality and other
academic activities (2004:12–13; 2005:12–13). The eighth matter concerns the general law
as it applies to higher education universities, comprehending everything from workers’
compensation legislation to freedom of information regimes (2004:10, 11, 13; 2005:14–15).
Finally, the Commonwealth clearly is interested in the possibility of a national higher
education regime, including the creation of a national higher education authority and the
enactment of over-arching higher education legislation (2004:18–21; 2005:18–21).   
This summary should not be regarded as stating exhaustively the extent of Commonwealth
ambitions in respect of higher education, or as suggesting that the degree of Commonwealth
focus is uniform across the range of subjects. All that is suggested is that each topic is,
currently, a matter of Commonwealth interest. It also should be noted that Commonwealth
constitutional capacity will vary significantly depending upon which area of higher education
is involved, as will be seen presently.  
The strict constitutional capacity of the Commonwealth
An assessment of the strict constitutional capacity of the Commonwealth effectively divides
itself into three parts. The first concerns a bundle of constitutional powers that undoubtedly
permit the Commonwealth directly to regulate certain aspects of the higher education sector,
although they very clearly do not allow the Commonwealth to regulate its totality. The second
concerns a single constitutional power of the Commonwealth that sometimes is put forward
as allowing direct regulation of all or most of the field of higher education – claims which will
be seen to be exaggerated. The third matter concerns the Commonwealth’s established
power to shape higher education, not through direct legislation, but through the making of
grants of financial assistance to higher education institutions upon terms and conditions.
This power is prodigious, but not without its limitations.
The starting point for any consideration of the Commonwealth’s constitutional power over higher
education must be to note that it possesses no specific power over such subjects as
‘education’, ‘higher education’ or ‘universities’ in general. The absence of such a specific power
3
5 Emerging chiefly through agendas relating to quality assurance and accountability (2004:12-13; 2005:12-13).
6 The Commonwealth already exercises substantial control over the research priorities of Universities through the
activities of such national bodies as the Australian Research Council and the National Health and Medical
Research Council. The Commonwealth’s strategic influence over research priorities is perhaps best expressed in
its establishment of National Research Priorities, substantially effected in a university context through the
Australian Research Council: see Department of  Education, Science and Training, The National Research
Priorities and their Associated Priority Goals. http://www.dest.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/AF4621AA-9F10-4752-A26F-
580EDFC644F2/2846/goals.pdf.
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7 Inserted after referendum by the Constitution Alteration (Social Services) Act 1946.
8 The section merely confers power in respect of a class of activities, rather than a power to make laws for a range
of purposes: see Higgins v. Commonwealth (1998) 79 FCR 528.
9 As expressed by the High Court in such cases as Victoria v. Commonwealth and Hayden (1975) 134 CLR 338;
Davis v. Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79.
10 Commonwealth v. Tasmania (the Dams Case) (1983) 158 1; Richardson v. Forestry Commission (1988) 164 CLR
261.
11 Article 28 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child does very vaguely bind Australia to
"Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate means." 
inevitably means that any attempt by the Commonwealth to legislate in this field will be attended
by significant challenges.  
(i) Specific powers concerning higher education
As noted above, the Commonwealth Parliament does enjoy certain narrow, specific powers
that indisputably confer legislative capacity in relation to particular aspects of higher
education. The most obvious is section 51(xxiiiA),7  which among other things grants power
to the Commonwealth in respect of the provision of benefits to students. Some existing
pieces of Commonwealth legislation — notably, parts of the Higher Education Funding Act
— owe much of their constitutionality to this provision.  This power, however, is very limited,
and does not go beyond the provision of benefits to authorise the making of wider legislation
to the general advantage of students.  Notably, the power the power is not expressed in the
much broader form of a capability to make laws generally ‘to the benefit of students’, and
thus does not permit the regulation of such matters as, for example, teaching or university
governance.8
A less obvious, but relevant Commonwealth power, is the so-called implied power from
nationhood.9 This power, discerned by the High Court as a necessary implication from the
Constitution, permits the Commonwealth to exercise limited executive (and some legislative)
power, where the existence of that power is intrinsic to the existence of Australia as a nation
state. Thus for example, the creation of the CSIRO as a body of national scientific research
presumably would be justified by reference to this power (see Zines 1992:258). Similarly, the
power might permit some limited control over aspects of higher education by the
Commonwealth, most notably in relation to the establishment of a national research agenda,
or some similarly national purpose. This said, the power has been strictly confined by the
High Court by reference to the imperative of maintaining the federal balance, and has been
narrowly interpreted in this context (Zines 1992:259). It certainly would not extend to a
comprehensive or substantial regulation of the higher education sector as a whole on the
basis of some suggested need for cohesive national control.
Other powers possessed by the Commonwealth may be tangentially relevant. One example
would be section 51(xxix) the external affairs power, which broadly permits the
Commonwealth to implement international agreements, or at the very least obligations
loosely imposed under such agreements.10 Its relevance in the present context, however, is
limited in the short term by the absence of appropriate international conventions imposing
relevant obligations,11 and in the long term by the implausibility of such conventions ever
being concluded in a degree of specificity sufficient to authorise significant legislative activity
in relation to higher education.12 Another broadly relevant power section 51(ii) the taxation
power, the use of which obviously could influence the shape of the higher education sector
through the grant of concessions or the imposition of enhanced rates of taxation,13 but which
hardly represents a cohesive basis for the development of higher education policy.  
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(ii) Major suggested power — the corporations power, section 51(xx)
The corporations power currently is being put forward as the primary potential basis for the
regulation by the Commonwealth of the higher education sector. The relevant portion of that
provision allows the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws regarding “trading
corporations”.14 There are two relevant questions regarding the application of the
corporations power to higher education institutions generally, and to universities in particular.
The first is whether they are indeed trading corporations, and so fall within the ambit of the
provision. The second relates to which activities of higher education institutions as trading
corporations  legitimately may be regulated by the Commonwealth under section 51(xx).  
To take the first question, universities obviously are corporations for the simple reason that
they overwhelmingly are incorporated under their own legislation, enacted by the relevant
State parliaments. The issue, therefore, is whether or not they are ‘trading’ corporations.
It is quite clear that the Framers of the Australian Constitution never intended that universities
should be regarded as trading corporations, a fact reflected in the comments of Sir Isaac
Isaacs during the Convention Debates. It is, however, equally clear that they are today
regarded by the nation’s courts as constituting such corporations. This follows from the fact
that the test of a trading corporation developed by the High Court in such decisions as
Tasmania v. Commonwealth turns not upon the nature or character of a corporation (on
which basis universities presumably would be ‘educational’ rather than ‘trading’
corporations) but rather upon whether or not a corporation conducts “significant” or
“substantial” trading activities.15 Here, it is quite clear that any modern university inevitably will
conduct significant trading activities, whether through  running bookshops, the sale of notes,
the provision of student accommodation or otherwise. Consequently, it is beyond doubt that
all Australian universities are trading corporations in a constitutional sense, and this was
confirmed by the Federal Court in the specific context of the University of Western Australia
in Quickenden in 2001.16
An altogether harder question relates to the range of activities of universities and other higher
education institutions that the Commonwealth may regulate on the admitted basis that they
are trading corporations. The difficulty here arises by virtue of the fact that it seems from the
judgements of the High Court that merely because a corporation is a trading corporation, it
does not follow that the Commonwealth will be able to regulate the entirety of its activities.
The general approach followed in cases such as Dingjan17 is that only those activities
connected  — on a very generous understanding — with the trade of a trading corporation
will be regulable activities under section 51(xx). In practice, this category of  activities has
included the actual trading activities of  a trading corporation; other activities very broadly
undertaken for the purposes of trade; and even activities of  third parties (such as unions),
where those actions have a substantial effect upon the trade-related operations of a trading
corporation. Beyond these clear categories of activity, the Commonwealth will only be able
5
12 A law must implement a stipulation of a treaty, not merely legislate upon its general subject: Victoria v Cth (1996)
187 CLR 416). 
13 It is established that the taxation power may be exercised by reference to consideration entirely extraneous to
taxation:
R. v. Barger (1908) 6 CLR 41. It thus would be theoretically possible for commonwealth to impose taxes upon
universities (as corporations) that did not comply with particular Commonwealth policies.
14 See e.g. DEST 2005:8, 11, 15, 19.
15 See e.g. State Superannuation Board v. Trade Practices Commission (1982) 150 CLR 282; Commonwealth v.
Tasmania (1983) 158 1.
16 Quickenden v. O’Connor (2001) FCA 303.
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17 Re Dingjan: Ex parte Wagner (1995) 183 CLR 323.
18 Quickenden v. O’Connor (2001) FCA 303.
to regulate the activities of a trading corporation under section 51(xx) if there is a sufficient
connection between the law in question and the character of a corporation as a ‘trading
corporation’.  The reality of this somewhat opaque test might more simplistically be rendered
as meaning that the extended activities of a trading corporation will have to display a real
‘business’ or ‘corporate’ character before they may be regulated under section 51(xx).
Applying these judicial criteria to the case of universities, it is perfectly clear that there will be
a sizeable proportion of the activities of those institutions that could be readily regulated by
the Commonwealth Parliament, either as comprising trade as such, or as comprising
activities broadly undertaken for the purposes of the trade. Such activities will include the
entry into consultancies for profit, the conduct of public events for profit, and a wide range
of commercial arrangements, including such matters as investment, borrowing, and
student accommodation.
By way of contrast, the actual provision of education through teaching and the awarding of
degrees, and all the processes attending18 that process such as examinations, assessment
and quality assurance, will be much harder to fit within any concept of trade or trade-related
activities. Putting the matter at its simplest, there would seem to be two profound difficulties
in so regarding such activities. First, the higher educational process self-evidently contains
many fundamental non-commercial elements — instructional, pedagogical, scholarly and
assessing — which together sit very uneasily with any notion of a simple ‘trade’ or ‘trade-
related’ paradigm. Second, the Commonwealth’s own intense regulatory intrusions into what
might be termed the higher education relationship might well be such as to deny to many of
its components any real connection with ‘trade’, a possibility noted by the Federal Court in
Quickenden.
Indeed, it would be reasonable to assume on the basis of existing authority that, as a matter
of constitutional reality, the Commonwealth would face extreme difficulty in attempting to
regulate those aspects of the operations of universities that are not easily characterised as
trading activities, activities undertaken for the purpose of trade, or activities having a special
business or corporate character within the Dingjan test. Realistically, this category of
activities would include all or most of those relating to governance, teaching and research.
The working conclusion, therefore, must be that while the corporations power presently
gives the Commonwealth Parliament a significant power to regulate the broadly commercial
and corporate activities of universities, it confers only a very limited power in relation to their
wider educational undertakings. Beyond this, it certainly confers no power for the
achievement of such wider Commonwealth regulatory objectives as the creation of a wide-
ranging national higher education authority, or the enactment of comprehensive national
higher education legislation.
All this, however, is subject to one fundamental caveat. Presently before the High Court is
the challenge of the States to the Commonwealth’s Work Choices legislation.19 That
legislation seeks to regulate a whole variety of aspects of what might be termed the
‘industrial envelope’ of trading corporations, with many of these aspects falling well-beyond
the category of trade and trade-related activities that traditionally form the heart of the
corporations power. The only basis upon which the Work Choices legislation could be upheld
in its entirety by the Court would be that the Commonwealth’s corporations power did
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indeed extend to the regulation of all the activities of trading corporations, including those
entirely divorced from the trading activities of such corporations, and from any aspect of their
corporate character.20 This is precisely the submission of the Commonwealth in the Work
Choices case, and if it is accepted, it would greatly expand the Commonwealth’s power to
regulate higher education. Put simply, the Commonwealth would be able directly to
regulate all activities of universities as trading corporations, including such activities as
teaching and research. The limited relevance of the corporations power to regulation of
Australian higher education therefore may undergo a very sudden and dramatic revision over
the next six months.
(iii) Commonwealth power in respect of funding
In practical terms, the Commonwealth’s funding power is an enormously important one in
the context of higher education. Section 81 of the Constitution allows the Commonwealth
Parliament to appropriate money “for the purposes of the Commonwealth”. It is now more
or less established that this phrase denotes such purposes as the Commonwealth sees fit,21
so that the Commonwealth effectively is empowered to appropriate money by way of grant
to such entities as it deems proper. It equally is clear that a power to grant includes a power
to grant conditionally, so that the Commonwealth may impose such conditions as it desires,
and enter into a wide range of agreements for the grant’s execution and administration.  The
relevant effect of this in the field of higher education are, first, that the Commonwealth may
make grants of financial assistance to universities and other entities of higher education: and
second, may impose upon such grants intricate contractual conditions requiring the
performance of a wide range of duties that may or may not relate directly to the subject
matter of the grant.  
To a limited extent, the Commonwealth also may use its incidental power22 to give such
schemes a legislative form, although the exercise of Commonwealth legislative power in this
way is both complex and limited, and the whole question of the capacity of the
Commonwealth to legislate in pursuance of appropriations and financial agreements is far
from resolved.23 Nevertheless, one theory of that capacity underlies at least parts of such
legislation as the Higher Education Funding Act and the Higher Education Support Act. The
net result is that while the Commonwealth has an undoubted capacity to fund higher
education and university bodies on a conditional and very directive basis, its ability to exploit
that capacity to create detailed administrative schemes is not without serious issues.
(iv)  Two complications
The first complication in relation to Commonwealth power over higher education is
comprised in section 51(xxxi). This provides that where the Commonwealth Parliament makes
a law for the compulsory acquisition of the property of any State or person (potentially including
the property of a university), the law in question must provide for acquisition on just terms: or
in other words, for fair monetary compensation. This provision might have some application to
a range of the more extreme options in relation to Commonwealth control over higher
education, such as the passage of a Commonwealth law purporting to transfer universities
7
19 As embodied in the Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Act 2005.
20 This analysis is based on Craven (2006).
21 Davis v. Commonwealth (1988) 166 CLR 79.
22 Constitution, section 51(xxxix).
23 See e.g. Victoria v. Commonwealth (1975) 134 CLR 338. 
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24 See e.g. Melbourne University Act 1958 ( Vic.), sections 41A, 41B; Queensland University of Technology Act 1998
(Qld.), section 48.
25 See e.g. Graham v. Paterson (1950) 81 CLR 1, 18 (Latham C.J.).
(along with university property) from their present status as State statutory corporations, to that
of statutory corporations of the Commonwealth. The most obvious reason for this would be
that, under the various pieces of State university legislation around Australia, the States
continue to have a complex proprietary relationship with many categories of university land.24
The result of this would be that ‘conversion’ of universities into legislative creatures of the
Commonwealth, with the consequent extinction of any relevant State interests in their land,
might involve a compulsory acquisition of  those interests under section 51(xxxi).
The second complication is, in some senses, a positive one from the perspective of the
Commonwealth, in that it does indeed involve a constitutional provision that could provide
an effective means by which the Commonwealth might obtain legislative power over higher
education and the universities. The difficulty is that employment of this means necessarily
would involve the cooperation of the States.  
The provision concerned here is section 51(xxxvii) of the Constitution, under which the
parliaments of the States may refer power over particular subject matters to the parliament
of the Commonwealth. The obvious possibility in the present context would be a referral of
power by all the States over higher education, universities, or some other appropriate
subject. This clearly would provide the Commonwealth with the legislative power required.
The option is, however, attended by at least two serious difficulties. The first is that its
deployment would require the active cooperation of the States, something in short supply in
the current poisonous atmosphere of Commonwealth–State relations. A second problem is
the potential revocability of a reference of power, with most constitutional authorities opining
that a State can withdraw reference,25 with the consequent possibility that it might at some
future date undermine a Commonwealth legislative regime over higher education. Given the
political and policy realities, however, this probably is more of a theoretical than a practical
consideration.  
Notwithstanding these two potential difficulties, the invocation of the reference power is in
principle the most effective possible means by which the weaknesses of the Commonwealth
regulatory power over higher education could be supplemented so as to produce a
comprehensive national regime. One obvious approach would be for the reference power to
be used, not to confer some broad power over ‘higher education’, but quite surgically by
way of ‘spot references’, granting the Commonwealth specific powers at whichever points
its own capacities were regarded as being most weak.  It certainly is true that the reference
power provides the most obviously effective means by which the Commonwealth could
pursue what might be called a ‘mega-agenda’ in relation to higher education: the creation of
a fully-articulated national higher education authority, and the enactment of truly national,
regulatory higher education legislation.
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Legal Conclusions
The general legal conclusions to be reached here are those already anticipated in the
introduction to this paper. The first is that the Commonwealth has extensive powers
regarding higher education. The second is that these powers are not presently sufficient to
allow a substantial Commonwealth takeover of the higher education sector, although this
conclusion may need to be revised in light of the result of the Work Choices litigation.
To this it might be objected that the Commonwealth has no need of formal legislative powers
so long as it can rely upon its financial muscle. It certainly is true that the Commonwealth
possesses vast financial power, and that it can achieve a great deal in the field of higher
education by the exercise of fiscal pressure. Nevertheless, it needs to be accepted that
financial power always will be inferior to legislative competence in a number of ways. 
First, the deployment of that power typically will be by such executive means as contracts
and agreements, which will not be the subject of parliamentary enactment or direct
parliamentary scrutiny, and thus involves a deeply unaccountable and non-transparent
exercise of governmental power. Second, such exercises of executive power have
drawbacks from the point of view of an incumbent Commonwealth Government, as their
lack of legislative status means that they may be readily changed by any future government
without the need for repeal and amendment. Third, it is constitutionally difficult for the
Commonwealth to base detailed administrative and policy schemes merely upon the
foundations of financial arrangements, and it is particularly difficult to base any legislative or
quasi-legislative schemes upon such arrangements. Fourth, the regulation of higher
education indirectly by means of financial power is a classic example of dysfunctional
federalism, involving a divided accountability for the sector, with the Commonwealth
exercising fiscal dominance but the States retaining legislative control.  Fifth, the regulatory
apparatus resulting from fiscally-based control inevitably is opaque, complex and difficult to
understand.  The final difficulty is one of psychology:  so long as the Commonwealth merely
is the paymaster rather than the formal regulator, it never can consider itself to be in strategic
control of the higher education sector.
It is, perhaps, a useful exercise in light of the various legal positions that have been
expressed in this paper to undertake a brief constitutional roll call of the regulatory aspects
of higher education in which the Commonwealth Government presently seems to be
interested, and to consider the extent of its constitutional power over each area. To begin
with, in terms of accreditation and establishment of higher education institutions, the
Commonwealth possesses no obvious constitutional power to control such processes, and
it is in particular quite clear that the corporations power would not easily extend in that
direction.  Moreover, it may be noted (as conceded by the Commonwealth) that it would be
practically difficult to regulate such activities by virtue of an exercise of the Commonwealth’s
financial power. This field of activity, therefore, falls to the States, unless they should chose
to refer it to the Commonwealth under some appropriate arrangement, or until the
corporations power is significantly expanded by judicial interpretation, as shortly may (or may
not) be the case.
In terms of governance of universities, the Commonwealth again possesses no direct power,
and it likewise would be exceedingly difficult to argue successfully that the corporations
power in its traditional formulation allows the Commonwealth to regulate the distinctive
governance arrangements of universities as universities. Of course, these arrangements may
9
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well be substantially controlled through the attachment of conditions to grants of
Commonwealth financial assistance, as they to some extent presently are, but this approach
will be subject to all the caveats expressed above concerning the use of financial assistance
as a regulatory tool. Much the same may be said of the teaching and syllabus arrangements
of universities, neither of which easily could be the subject of direct legislation by the
Commonwealth (even under the corporations power), although they can be indirectly
affected by the grant of conditional financial assistance. Similar views may be expressed
concerning the regulation of the overall research profile of universities, subject to the proviso
that a narrow degree of high-level national direction might be justified by virtue of the national
implied power. Again, all of these conclusions are subject to whatever expansionist
interpretations of the corporations power might be adopted in the Work Choices case, and
it is undeniable that acceptance by the High Court of the contention that all acts of a trading
corporation may be regulated under that power would bring virtually the totality of the
operations of universities within the control of the Commonwealth (Craven 2006).
As regards the ownership and management of university land, the commercial aspects of
such activities certainly could be regulated by the Commonwealth under the corporations
power.  Non-commercial aspects, such as those relating to planning, would remain a matter
for the States. The wider commercial operations of higher education institutions —
comprising such matters as student accommodation, borrowing, and the conduct of for-
profit activities — undoubtedly may be regulated by the Commonwealth pursuant to the
corporations power.  Reporting and accountability regimes in relation to such commercial
activities also would be authorised under that power, with wider reporting and accountability
requirements (for example, in relation to teaching and research) effectively needing to be
based upon Commonwealth–university financial arrangements.  As regards the application
of the general law to universities, in such areas as State taxation, environmental protection,
workers’ compensation and freedom of information, the Commonwealth may legislate to the
extent that this would comprise the regulation of commercial and corporate activities, but not
otherwise. The only effective means for the Commonwealth to regulate beyond this ambit
would be by means of conditions attached to its own assistance, although there would be
obvious legal difficulties were those conditions to conflict with the relevant provisions of a
State’s general laws.
Finally, the Commonwealth has no obvious legislative power to ordain an overall national
apparatus of higher education regulation. In particular, the Commonwealth would not appear
to possess an independent head of legislative power to create a comprehensive national
body of higher education regulation and accreditation, nor would it possess such power as
would be necessary to ground general national higher education legislation. All of this merely
goes to reinforce the general conclusions already reached: that the Commonwealth has a
significant, but limited legislative power in respect of higher education, with its greater power
being found in its capacity to fund upon conditions. The latter power, however, is subject to
its own, particular limitations. Once again, however, all is subject to the position reached on
the corporations power by the High Court in Work Choices. An adverse result for the States
in that case inevitably would lead to the conclusion that the corporations power (together
with the incidental power) would justify the creation of national regulatory body for the
purpose of overseeing constitutionally regulable corporations.
10
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Strategic Constitutional Analysis
The object of this section of the paper is to put the preceding constitutional analysis into
a context of policy, politics and practicality. Here, a number of important points need to
be made.
The first is to reinforce the fundamental conclusion already reached in this paper: that the
Commonwealth’s direct legislative powers in relation to higher education and universities
(presently) are relatively confined. Indeed, it would be fair to say that there has been a
something of a concerted attempt by the Commonwealth, both through its published papers
and the public pronouncements of its officers, to talk-up aspects of its power, and in
particular the corporations power. These attempts are, however, rather transparent. No
individual power of the Commonwealth, including the corporations power, would at the
present day effectively ground comprehensive higher education legislation.
Again, as has been concluded above, the real capacity of the Commonwealth in relation to
universities and higher education is a financial one to provide grants upon conditions. This is
a real and enormous power, which can be and has been used to demand a wide-ranging
suite of concessions from higher education institutions in return for funding. For the reasons
already outlined, however, a power to influence through funding, is not the same thing as a
power to directly and comprehensively regulate by legislation possessing the force of law.
Flowing from these conclusions is the vital point that the Commonwealth presently would not
be able to achieve substantial legislative control of the higher education sector through its
own unilateral action, the logical corollary of which is that it would require the cooperation of
the States to reach this goal. This illustrates a central reality of the current constitutional—
policy matrix regarding higher education, that the States are indeed critical players,
notwithstanding the Commonwealth’s contempt, the sector’s disregard and their own
substantial lack of focus and financial commitment. Indeed, the Commonwealth’s current
overstatement of its constitutional position may be regarded as a softening-up exercise
towards the end of extracting State compliance.  
In reality, the States could cooperate to provide the Commonwealth with a national higher
education regulatory capacity in a number of ways, of which two are the most obvious. The
first and most direct would be for the States to refer power to the Commonwealth over an
appropriate subject matter — higher education, universities, or some aspect of each —
under section 51(xxxvii) of the Constitution, and for the Commonwealth to legislate in reliance
upon that referral. The States would be able to insert into the referral sufficient legislative
limitations to protect their own interests, and potentially those of universities. A more
complex approach, and one that would accord the Commonwealth less and the States
correspondingly more control, would be for the Commonwealth and the States to enter into
a cooperative legislative scheme for the regulation of higher education. Again, probably the
simplest version of such a scheme would be for the Commonwealth to pass such legislation
in respect of the Australian Capital Territory under section 122 of the Constitution (‘the
territories power’) and for the States to adopt and apply that legislation to their own higher
education institutions. Such an approach (or a modification thereof) logically could extend
both to the creation of a national higher education authority, and the substantive enactment
of national legislation regulating the higher education sector.
11
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Thus, if the Commonwealth is serious about pursuing a legislative national higher education
framework in the absence of judicial expansion of its powers it necessarily will have to accept
the reality that Commonwealth–State cooperation is indispensable, whether that cooperation
is to be secured by threat or seduction. Logically, this would involve cooperation both in
terms of process and product. By way of process, some version of a cooperative legislative
approach, as outlined above, would need to be adopted. As regards product, a cooperative
legislative process should produce a cooperative legislative outcome, which proceeds upon
the assumption that higher education does indeed comprise a partnership between
Commonwealth, State and sector, in which subtly differing and interlocking interests are
recognised and accommodated, rather than existing as a Commonwealth regulatory ‘lake’.
Just as the Commonwealth needs to understand that cooperation will be indispensable to
the achievement of any satisfactory national or quasi-national outcome, so the universities
must better understand their own relationships within the Commonwealth–State–Sector
triangle. Thus, in times of relatively slight State funding for universities, there can be a
tendency for them to discount the States as players in the higher education game. The
reality, however, is that the States will be vital players in any outcome from the present
debate, if only because their grudging acceptance of Commonwealth legislative directions
will be indispensable. Among other consequences of this reality is the fact that any university
or universities seeking to influence the direction of Commonwealth policy will be well advised
to press their views strongly with the government of their home State, with which the final
capacity to extract legislative concessions probably will lie.
For their part, the States also must put aside years of comparative neglect and recognise the
importance of universities to themselves as polities. A starting point is to note that universities
represent massive repositories of historic State investment. In more contemporary terms,
they are major drivers of State education and training sectors, and a crucial element in the
direction of wider State employment markets. They are critical to industrial research and
development within a State, and significant contributors to State policies and innovation.  It
is a matter of vital interest to the States that these financial and intellectual investments and
capacities be preserved as items of State infrastructure.
Finally, all players must realise that they are not the only participants in this particular
constitutional game. Most notably, it will be the High Court of Australia that ultimately will
determine whether and to what extent the Commonwealth possesses the necessary legislative
power to wrest control of the higher education sector from the States. Here, the Court
traditionally has been deeply disposed to expand Commonwealth power, and the States could
not be sanguine that the Court will take a narrow view of the corporations power in the Work
Choices litigation, and derivatively of its application to the higher education sector. Were the
Court to take a determinedly broad view of that power, the States would lose their present partial
veto over Commonwealth control of higher education, in favour of pervasive control by
Canberra. High Court decisions are notoriously difficult to predict, but a Commonwealth victory
in Work Choices is more probable than not. Certainly, there is every evidence that the
Commonwealth takes a bullish view of the Court’s likely course.
46629 Public Policy Text  6/11/06  1:44 PM  Page 12
PUBLIC POLICY
This optimism, however, may conceivably be misplaced. The Court has shown some signs
of nervousness towards the potential scope of the corporations power at least since the late
nineties.25 Moreover, there is reason to suspect that the Court might not be particularly
anxious to engineer the conferral of power upon a single sphere of government (the
Commonwealth) to control the chief institutional intellectual apparatus of Australian society.
Moreover, the Court currently is going through an intensely conservative phase of its own
jurisprudence, which is not obviously favourable towards dramatic centralisation of power.
Such factors suggest that the Commonwealth at this stage would be unwise to place an
overly optimistic interpretation upon its powers, and the States foolish to discount their own
capacities to resist Commonwealth incursion.  
Conclusions
The overall conclusion to emerge from this analysis is that, if it be desired to create a system
of national regulation for Australian higher education, that system ought to be founded upon
cooperation between the States and the Commonwealth. In the absence of sufficient
legislative power of its own, the Commonwealth will require some form of State supporting
legislation to create such a system. Logically, any resulting legislative scheme should
recognise the fundamental reality of higher education within Australia as a tripartite
partnership between the Commonwealth, the States and universities. A failure to do so, and
in particular any attempt by the Commonwealth to rely upon an insufficient foundation of
constitutional power, will produce an outcome that is problematic legally, administratively and
politically. Even were the Commonwealth to gain total constitutional power over universities
as trading corporations, the ideal result would be a cooperative outcome that recognised the
magnitude of Commonwealth investment, while also recognising the reality of the universities
as items of State culture and infrastructure.
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